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Technological Change 
and the Right to Strike 
H.D. Woods 
A collective agreement covers only part of the rela-
tionship between the employées covered by the agreement 
and the employer. Some conflicts of interest not covered by 
the agreement may be resolved voluntarily by negotiation 
from time to time, but there remain conflicts of interest 
in which either no resolution can be worked out on one 
party, the employer, supported by the residual rights 
doctrine and the agreement, refuses to negotiate. The issue 
has become a matter of great public controversy in Canada 
in récent years and was highlighted by the technological 
change debate. 
INTRODUCTION 
The signing of a collective agreement establishes a set of standards 
and rights and obligations involving employées, the union, and the 
employer, but it does not settle ail issues which may arise during the life 
of the agreement. Issues of interprétation and application of the agree-
ment can be resolved by référence to the grievance procédure, and arbi-
tration if necessary, but there remains the problem of conflicts of interest 
over matters which are not covered by the agreement. 
First it should be noted that the 
collective agreement covers only a 
part of the relationship of the par-
ties. In day-to-day opérations innu-
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merable small conflicts of interest émerge and may be settled by discussion 
between employées or union représentatives and the employer or his 
représentatives on the spot. The collective relationship is a living, changjng 
process which cannot be fully encased in the collective agreement. The 
agreement covers those matters which the parties are prepared to recognize 
as establishing a system of definable rights and obligations. The rest of 
the relationship involves a multitude of things which require non-con-
tractual accommodations if administration is to be effective. Anyone 
with expérience in industrial relations will recognize the existence of an 
informai process of accommodation which is not necessarily linked with 
the formai contents of collective agreements and the procédures provided 
by it. Indeed some of the informai arrangements at times may be incon-
sistent with the contents of the collective agreement itself. 
Aside from both the issues settled by the collective agreement and 
the informai accommodations affected by the parties, there are clashes 
of interest which do not f ail within the scope of the clauses of the agree-
ment and the dispute settlement procédures contained therein, nor do 
they lend themselves to easy resolution by informai accommodation. Thèse 
include union demands or employer counter demands which were not 
conceded when the agreement was signed. Also included are issues which 
were not on the bargaining table at ail before the signing of the agreement, 
some of which become apparent only after the agreement is signed. Both 
of thèse, and particularly the latter, may cause serious damage to 
industrial relationships. 
Issues which hâve been negotiated without becoming part of the 
union contract because the parties do not reach agreement, may in a 
sensé be considered « settled » for the time being when a gênerai contract 
is signed. Their very exclusion is part of the settlement. Thèse are the 
kinds of issues which will probably be on the bargaining table at the next 
renégociation period. If one of the parties feels very strongly about them 
they can be a source of serious strain on the relationship, until resolved. 
New issues which hâve not been included in negotiations are menac-
ing to the relationship because they are usually unexpected and pose a 
new threat to some existing right or interest. Such issues are the product 
of the dynamics of the system itself which in ail probability will become 
increasingly important as the tempo of change rises. Illustrations are 
disturbances in the labour market caused by, for example, the resort to 
unanticipated forms of sub-contracting, the introduction of new production 
technologies, and re-engineered job fonctions not expected by the unions 
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and the employées they represent, and work assignments which seem to 
violate past practice, and so on. 
There in no sure way of resolving thèse issues since it is to be 
expected that arbitrators would usually rule that they are not in violation 
of the contact since they are not covered by it, even with a very libéral 
interprétation of the arbitrator's rôle. They are conflicts of interest and 
the arbitrator is normally not authorized to détermine such conflics. They 
represent the kind of issue which really calls for negotiated settlements. 
But the unions' right, under Canadian law, to insist on negotiation ter-
minâtes for the time being with the signing of the agreement, and in the 
usual case it cannot legally resort to the strike threat. To do so would, in 
most Canadian jurisdictions, be a violation of the collective agreement or 
of the law or both. 
Interest conflicts arising during the life of an agreement which hâve 
particularly become the centre of public controversy during the past two 
décades are those related to the employment impact of technological 
change. At least this is the impression gained from a study of the published 
statements of the unions and employers organizations, although the 
problem of dislocation is clearly much more widely based than on tech-
nological change alone, unless a very broad définition of technological 
change is accepted. In any case, organized labour is confronted with the 
problem of dislocation of the employment of those it represents ïn col-
lective bargaining, whether it can be traced; directly to the introduction of 
technological change or not. 
It should not be necessary at this stage of the debate to make the 
case that employment disruption does take place, nor that technological 
change or industrial conversion is a cause of such disruption. Whether 
employment in the economy as a whole is decreased or increased by tech-
nological innovation is a matter for concern to those responsible for 
planning national manpower policies and programs, but it has little re-
levance at the micro level, where collective bargaining functions. Clearly 
spécifie jobs of particular employées do disappear and do confront 
displaced employées with Personal crises concerning work and income. 
A relevant question, however, is whether or not the problem of dis-
location is an appropriate issue for collective bargaining. If it is, a second 
question présents itself ; viz, how can the problems flowing from change 
best be brought within the scope of collective bargaining ? This involves 
questions of the appropriate bargaining unit, the structure of unions 
themselves, the level of responsibility to be assumed by public authority, 
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and the inter-relationships among employers, unions, and government 
agencies.1 In économie terms the question is who is to bear the social and 
économie costs of technological change. In the context of business 
décisions the employer will be inclined to pass the cost back to the labour 
force through layoff or dismissals. Unions, in their rôle as protector of the 
interests of those they represent, will be inclined either to restrain the 
employer from introducing technological change, or to force the em-
ployer to agrée to various remédies designed to compensate the adversely 
affected employées, or to assist them in their adjustment. Unions also 
incline toward political settlements by putting pressure on governmental 
agencies to corne to the rescue of the redundant workers. Whether govern-
ments will join with the unions and assist in imposing the cost of change 
on the employers, or protect the employer interest and leave the burden 
on the displaced workers, or assume a public responsibility by providing 
remédiai programs for the displaced workers, will dépend on the political 
climate and the power équations which influence political décisions. Even 
when it is accepted that the solution calls for a sharing of the responsibility 
by government, employer, and employée, there is no agreement as to the 
relative share of responsibility that should be born by each. In addition 
to the question of the relative responsibility to be shared, there is also the 
problem of the mechanisms that will be used to ensure that they each will 
in fact assume their respective burdens. 
It should be noted that collective bargaining does not usually create 
jobs. Job création is a function of managerial décisions regarding the level 
of économie activity management chooses to reach, as well as of the mix 
of labour and other productive agents chosen. Consequently, if techno-
logical change threatens to eliminate some jobs, the most the unions can 
do is to block the introduction of change and thereby protect the exisring 
job holders. However, there is one way in which a union might create 
jobs ; that is by lowering wages to the point where management might 
find it profitable to expand employment. Naturally, such action by a union 
would be unpopular among those whose wages are lowered. 
What then, if any, is the rôle of collective bargaining. With respect 
to the problem of technologically created redundancy the Task Force 
Report has this to say : 2 
i See Arthur A. KRUGER, « Human Adjustment to Technological Change : An 
Economist's View » ; Relations Industrielles, Québec, Vol. 26, No. 2, April 1971. 
2
 Canadian Industrial Relations, Ottawa: Privy Council, 1968, p. 118. 
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« Until recently the task of finding an adéquate response to this 
challenge was left largely to collective bargaining. Unions were left 
with a choice of attempting to resist, to compete with or to control 
change or to choose some combination of the three. Historically, there 
are examples of resort by unions to the two former alternatives, but 
for the most part obstructionism has proved futile, particularly as a 
long run tactic. Unions today generally accept the change as inévitable 
and even derisable concomitance of the existing socio-economic-political 
system and concentrate their efforts on cushioning its impact on their 
members. 
« The labour movement has met with varying degrees of success in 
attempting to use collective bargaining for this purpose. In most cases 
unions hâve won full seniority protection, so that junior employées 
are the first to be affected by displacement. However, unions hâve 
sometimes demanded and won such narrow and confining seniority 
units that they hâve diminished the security afforded senior workers. 
Through collective bargaining most unions hâve also won the right to 
grieve on wages and conditions established on new or restructured jobs. 
In a few cases they hâve secured a voice in the initial setting of those 
wages and conditions. 
« The labour movement has also won some procédural and substantive 
concessions in other areas. Procedurally, numerous collective agree-
ments now provide for a measure of advance notice and consultation. 
Substantively, there are even more agreements that include retraining, 
relocation, income maintenance, severance pay, early retirement, or 
similar types of provisions that offer some relief to those dislocated. 
« While acknowledging the rôle that collective bargaining can play in 
this area, it is important to recognize its limitations. First is the limited 
coverage of trade unionism. For the majority of workers who do not 
benefit from collective bargaining, it does not afford any possible 
protection. Second are the varying degrees of protection afforded 
différent workers who are covered by collective bargaining. Some 
benefit from elaborate schemes, others are afforded no protection 
whatever. Third is the inéquitable and uneconomic nature of some of 
the provisions which hâve been negotiated. For example, most 
severance pay plans are based on years of service, with benefits often 
bearing no relationship to the relative needs of those affected. Indi-
viduals with the same seniority usually receive the same compensation 
despite the fact that some may move directly to équivalent jobs while 
others may never find regular work again. Last is the fact that 
collective bargaining cannot create employment. It can at best only 
serve to préserve obsolète jobs by sanctioning unnecessary work 
practices, or to reshuffle job holders through such measures as early 
retirement plans designed to induce older workers to retire so that 
younger workers will not be displaced. 
« Given the limitations of collective bargaining in this area, the 
question remains, what should be done ? A combination of public and 
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private policies is needed to provide a framework for dealing with 
change, thèse should be flexible enough to take care of the individual 
problems that arise, and efficient enough to ensure that the benefits 
of change are not consumed in the effort to cope with the adjustments. 
«The Task Force accepts the following principles. First management 
should be protected in its freedom to make changes which in them-
selves, are not in violation of a collective agreement. Second, workers 
should be protected by an expanded arsenal of public and private 
programs designed to facilitate their movement among jobs and 
localities without undue cost to themselves. Third, a union should be 
free to take action to induce management to negotiate a plan to solve 
the conséquences expected to follow from the proposed changes or to 
delay the changes themselves, or to negotiate and strike over the right 
to strike on the issue during the life of an agreement. 
« In keeping with thèse three principles, we would give priority to 
public policies to meet the following needs. First is a pressing need 
to place more emphasis on éducation for adjustment at ail levels in 
the school System in order to ensure maximum human adaptability. 
Second is a need to maintain a high level of employment so that other 
jobs are available for those displaced by industrial conversion. Third 
is a need for an active labour market policy designed to facilitate 
mobility between jobs through improved information, counselling, 
upgrading, retraining, relocation and income maintenance programs. 
Fourth is a need to develop as many transférable fringe benefit plans 
as possible in order to minimize the sacrifice which workers hâve to 
make when they move from job to job. Fifth is a need to expand 
community dislocation programs designed to facilitate either the rede-
velopment of communities threatened by adverse industrial shifts or 
the movement of idled resources to other localities where they can be 
employed. » 
I have quoted rather fully from the report of the Task Force because 
I believe there has been much public misunderstanding of thèse sections ; 
indeed they seem to have been largely ignored, perhaps because of the 
fear that the recommandations regarding opening of the collective agree-
ments was likely to produce a chaotic situation. More will be said on this 
later, but in the meantime it is well to note that the Task Force places 
the highest priority on public policies and programs designed to préserve 
as much employer freedom as possible and at the same time to impose 
on public authorities and institutions the major responsibilities of retrain-
ing and improved labour market opérations. Solutions via collective 
bargaining were given a decidedly secondary and assisting rôle. 
Before examining certain proposais for dealing with technologioally 
induced redundancy, I wish to draw attention to certain provisions already 
existing in Canadian labour relations laws which I believe have been almost 
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entirely or were totally ignored by those who hâve participated in the 
public debate. The conventional wisdom regarding strikes during the 
terms of an agreement is that they are illégal. This is generally true and 
both Fédéral and Provincial labour laws prohibit the resort to économie 
force over disputes arising during the term of agreement. Thèse laws also 
provide for final and binding settlement of disputes of interprétation and 
application by arbitration or other-wise as a quid pro quo for the déniai 
of the right to strike and lockout. But there is an exception. Section 128 
of the Canada Labour Code reads : 
«Sec. 128. (1) Except in respect of a dispute that is subject to 
the provisions of subsection (2), 
(a) no employer bound by or who is a party to a collective agree-
ment shall déclare or cause a lockout with respect to any employée 
bound by the collective agreement or on whose behalf the collective 
agreement was entered into, and 
(b) during the term of the collective agreement, no employée 
bound by a collective agreement or on whose behalf a collective agree-
ment has been entered into shall go on strike and no bargaining agent 
that is a party to the agreement shall déclare or authorize a strike of 
any such employée. 
(2) Where a collective agreement is in force and any dispute arises 
between the parties thereto with référence to the revision of a provision 
of the agreement that by the provisions of the agreement is subject 
to revision during the term of the agreement, the employer bound 
thereby or who is a party thereto shall not déclare or cause a lockout 
with respect to any employée bound thereby or on whose behalf the 
collective agreement has been entered into, and no such employée shall 
strike and no bargaining agent that is a party to the agreement shall 
déclare or authorize a strike of any such employée until the bargaining 
agent of such employées and the employer or représentatives authorized 
by them on their behalf hâve bargained collectively and hâve failed 
to conclude an agreement on the matters in dispute, and either 
(a) a Conciliation Board has been appointed to endeavour to 
bring about agreement between them and seven days hâve elapsed 
from the date on which the report of the Conciliation Board was 
received by the Minister, or 
(b) one of the parties has requested the Minister in writing to 
appoint a Conciliation Board to endeavour to bring about agreement 
between them and fifteen days hâve elapsed since the Minister received 
the said request and 
(i) no notice under subsection 134 (2) has been given by the 
Minister, or 
(ii) the Minister has notified the party so requesting that he has 
decided not to appoint a Conciliation Board. > 
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Shorn of its légal jargon the Section appears to a layman to mean that 
if the parties to a collective agreement include a re-opener clause in a 
particular provision of the agreement, the resort to strike or lockout on a 
re-opened clause during the term of the agreement is perfectly légal, if 
the parties hâve met the conciliation requirements of the law. In other 
words, there already exists in the Canada Labour Code a provision by 
which the negotiating parties may opt out of the strike and lockout pro-
hibition by specifying that either party may open up identified clauses for 
re-negotiations during the life of an agreement. This same provision is 
found in the labour relations laws of five provinces also3. The conven-
tional wisdom appears to be wrong, therefore, with regard to the Fédéral 
jurisdiction, Nova Scotia, Manitoba, Newfoundland, New Brunswick, and 
Québec, and to be right with respect to British Columbia, Alberta, Sas-
katchewan, Ontario, and Prince Edward Island. I wish to emphasize, 
however, that the right to set aside the prohibition of the strike, during 
the term of a collective agreement, already exists in the Fédéral jurisdic-
tion and five provinces. I suggest that this privilège of striking on re-ope-
ner s has been included in the new (the Fédéral) Bill 183 in the combi-
nation of Clauses 147(2) and 180. 
With this as background it will be useful to examine the various 
proposais which hâve been advanced for dealing with collective bar-
gaining as an instrument for resolving some of the problems of disloca-
tion associated with industrial conversion. 
THE TASK FORCE REPORT 
« We recommend that the negotiating parties hâve power by mutual 
agreement to opt out of the restraint on the strike and the lockout and 
the requirement to establish machinery for the seulement of disputes 
resulting from the permanent displacement of personnel occasioned by 
industrial conversion arising during the period when an agreement is in 
force4 ». 
3 Nova Scotia Trade Union Act, Section 23 
Manitoba Labour Relations Act, Section 26 
Newfoundland Labour Relations Act, Section 23 
New Brunswick Labour Relations Act, Section 21 
Québec Labour Code, Section 95 
The first four provinces use language identical with or close to that of the 
Fédéral Statute. The Québec Code uses différent language, but it means the same 
thing. It reads, « It is forbidden to strike during the period of a collective agreement, 
unless the agreement contains a clause permitting the revision thereof by the 
parties . . . > 
4
 Canadian Industrial Relations, op. cit., p. 195. 
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It is difficult and perhaps improper for one not trained in the mys-
teries of the law to know precisely what a given statute means, but it 
is hard to avoid the conclusion that the Task Force proposai recommends 
little more, if anything at ail, than what exists in the provision already 
quoted and discussed. It may be that the opting-out clause in the Fédéral 
statute could be applied only to a substantive provision in the agreement. 
If that be so, the Task Force proposai goes a little farther since it would 
be necessary only to include a clause in the agreement that provided for 
negotiation of displacement or redundancy issues if they should arise after 
the collective agreement is signed to permit the parties jointly to set aside 
the strike prohibition. Certainly, a charge that the Task Force recom-
mended the opening up of collective contracts to industrial warfare by 
agreement of the parties to so open them, means very little in the light of 
the existing permission in the law. 
A proposai based on the same principle of negotiating re-openers and 
the right to strike during the life of the agreement, but broader in scope 
was presented to the Nova Scotia government in a report on construction 
industry labour relations5. Nova Scotia is one of the provinces which 
permits a strike on a contracted re-opener if the required conciliation 
steps hâve been taken. The recommendation was that right be retained 
and that the parties might also agrée that certain specified issues or 
areas not covered by substantive clauses in the agreement could be 
subject to negotiation and the strike or lockout during the life of the 
contract. Unlike the présent law, bargaining would not be limited to 
modifying existing substantive clauses. Unlike the Task Force report, 
bargaining would not be limited to issues associated with technological 
change or conversion. The parties would jointly détermine the territory 
to be covered. 
In effect this proposai would be one which gave the union the right 
to reduce the résidu al rights territory by bargaining. 
THE PROPOSED BILL C-183 
The proposais in Bill 183 concerned with Technological Change are 
complicated in the extrême. 6 Stated as briefly as possible the proposed 
5 H.D. WOODS, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Industrial Relations 
in the Nova Scotia Construction Industry, Nova Scotia Department of Labour, Sep-
tember, 1970. 
6 Bill C-183, Sections 149-153 and Section 180. 
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législation provides a définition of technological change ; requîtes an 
employer bound by a collective agreement who proposes to effect a tech-
nological change that is likely to effect the terms and conditions or 
security of employment of a significant number of his employées, to give 
notice of ninety days of the technological change to the union holding the 
bargaining rights ; sets out five classes of information that must be included 
in the notice ; provides that the government, on recommendation of the 
Labour Relations Board may make régulations specifying the number of 
employées or the method of determining what is meant by « significant » ; 
establishes authority in the Labour Relations Board to enforce the notice 
requirement by ordering the employer not to proceed with the proposed 
change for up to ninety days ; authorize a bargaining agent which has 
received a notice of technological change to apply to the Board for an 
order granting the agent leave to serve notice on the employer to commence 
collective bargaining ; instructs the Board to grant such leave when it is 
satisfied that the proposed change is likely to substantially and adversely 
effect the terms and conditions or security of employment of a significant 
number of employées ; forbids the employer to introduce the proposed 
change until the Board has rejected the union's request to serve notice to 
commence collective bargaining, or if such a leave is granted, until an 
agreement has been reached or conciliation requirements hâve been met 
and the union has acquired the right to strike. 
There are provisions in the proposed law which make it possible 
for the employer or the employée and union acting jointly to set aside 
thèse requirements. An employer can do so by giving the required notice 
to the bargaining agent prior to the signing of an agreement. Presumably 
this gives to the union the opportunity to negotiate on the issue before 
the right to strike is blocked and the employer is protected by the residual 
rights doctrine once an agreement is signed. Or the parties! can jointly set 
aside the application of thèse clauses by including in the agreement they 
sign provisions that specify procédures by which any matters that relate 
to terms and conditions or security of employment likely to be affected 
by technological change shall be handled. In the first of thèse provisions 
the employer has warned the union and the latter's remedy lies in nego-
tiating the issue and striking if necessary. If it does not choose this rocky 
road it loses its re-opening rights. In the second case the parties hâve 
either resolved the issue by the contents of the collective agreement and 
no further bargaining during the term of the agreement is necessary, or 
they hâve agreed to opt out of légal provisions. In other words they hâve 
closed their contract. 
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This proposai differs from the présent Fédéral Code in one or two 
important respects. Perhaps most important is the fact that the présent 
law requires the parties at the time of negotiation of a collective agreement 
to provide for re-openers if the contract bar to negotiations supported by 
the strike is to be removed, whereas Bill C-183 builds into the law a new 
System of union rights to intra-contract negotiations subject to the dis-
crétion of the Labour Relations Board. The union does not hâve to bargain 
into the agreement the right to negotiate and strike on the technological 
change issue as it would under either the présent law or the Task Force 
recommendation. It does hâve to convince the Labour Relations Board 
to grant leave to serve notice to negotiate. 
THE FREEDMAN REPORT 
Judge Freedman was commissioned to deal with the « run-through » 
problem associated with technological change on the railways. However, 
he asserted that his report « is intented to apply not only to run-throughs, 
but also, wherever it can be applied, to similar situations in gênerai. » 7 
Paraphrasing and generalizing the report, Judge Freedman recommended 
that either party should hâve the right to refer to an arbitrator the question 
whether a proposed technological change falls within a class of changes 
which would materially alter the working conditions which were in effect 
when the collective agreement was negotiated, cr within a class of change 
that did not materially alter thèse conditions. If the arbitrator decided 
that the proposed change would not materially change the working con-
ditions, the employer would be free to introduce the changes. However, if 
the arbitrator ruled otherwise, the employer would be required to with-
draw his plan until the next open period, unless, of course, the union were 
agreeable to negotiate before that date. In other words, the union would 
hâve a veto on innovations which caused a material change in working 
conditions. 
The object of the Freedman report appears to be to prevent the 
employer from introducing major changes, the union not having the usual 
opportunity to negotiate and strike if necessary, without subjecting the 
parties to the work-stoppage possibility during the life of the agreement. 
But the method would hâve the effect of slowing down the rate of change. 
The Honorable Mr. Marchand proposed to solve this problem by suggest-
7 Report of Industrial Inquiry ^Commission on Canadian National Railways 
Run-Throughs », p. 145. 
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ing that a management move to introduce a major change would terminate 
the existing contract and open the door to negotiation for a new contract. 8 
Saskatchewan has recently (1972) enacted législation9 to deal with 
this issue under the title of the « Technological Change Rationalization 
Act ». However it goes far beyond technological change as that expression 
is usually understood by adding to the usual définition « the removal by 
an employer of any part of his work, undertaking or business ». Not only 
is technological change covered, but it would appear that contracting out 
and runaway opérations as well. However, time and the courts will no 
doubt sort out the précise meaning. 
A major différence between the Saskatchewan Act and the Fédéral 
Act, which it resembles, is that the Saskatchewan law empowers the union 
to give notice of collective bargaining as soon as the employer gives notice 
of change while the parties are operating under an agreement. There is 
no requirement to ask permission from the Labour Relations Board to 
give such notice as is the case in the Fédéral law. However, the employer 
can appeal to the Board to prevent the union exercising this right. In the 
situations where the employer has given notice of change before the 
signing of an agreement, or within the notice period for renegotiation of 
an expiring agreement, the Board is empowered to deny the union's right. 
However, while in the Fédéral case it appears that the parties can close 
the contrast on the issue, in Saskatchewan they cannot. There is no opting 
out provision. The union cannot, under pressure, or in return for some 
other concession give up ils re-opening right, unless the agreement 
provides a solution to the redundancy problem. Since the Saskatchewan 
law does not prohibit a strike during the life of an agreement an impasse 
in negotiations on a technological re-opener could lead to a strike. 
Both with regard to the scope of technological change and the pro-
hibition of opting out the Saskatchewan policy is much more drastic than 
the Fédéral. 
The Freedman recommendations differ from those of Bill C-183 in 
important respects. Both protect the employer's right to innovate where 
the impact on working conditions would be minimal. But Bill 183 re-
establishes the strike as the ultimate sanction in major cases while the 
Freedman recommendation gives the union a veto power. Clearly the 
union's power to win concessions from the employer during the life of an 
8 Arthur A. KRUGER, op. cit., p. 297. 
9 Bill 134 of 1972. 
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agreement is much greater under Freedman than under Bill 183. This 
latter attempts to bring the issue under genuine collective bargaining 
supported by the conventional pressure of the work-stoppage threat. 
PAUL WEILER 
The most sweeping proposai advanced in Canada in this controversy 
is that of Professor Paul Weiler.10 « At the présent time, three factors 
combine to deter effective negotiations about industrial change and its 
effect on working conditions. In the first place, when the parties enter 
into a collective agreement their duty to bargain ceases, notwithstanding 
the fact they hâve not, in fact, reached agreement about many issues. 
Second, even if negotiations were to take place they can easily become a 
charade because the unions hâve lost, under the statute, their reserve 
power to enforce concessions. Thirdly, the fact that arbitrators hâve been 
forced to uphold the management claim to unilatéral, residual rights, 
makes it harder, psychologically, for management to agrée to limitations 
on thèse 'rights'. 
« The logical solution to thèse problems is relatively simple,... the 
duty to bargain must be held to continue during the term of a collective 
agreement in a meaningful way ». 
Weiler recommends that the compulsory no-strike clause should be 
deleted from the statute and its insertion in the agreement should be 
subject to negotiation by the parties. In effect, Weiler is recommending 
that we adopt the American position. If that were done, we could get a 
fairly reliable notion of the probable effect on collective bargaining by 
studying American expériences. 
Weiler has also posed the interesting possibility that the right to 
negotiate during the term of a collective agreement might, by law, be 
limited to the issues not covered by the agreement. This, of course, would 
be a repeal of the residual rights doctrine. The agreement would cover the 
rights and obligations of the parties and ail outside it would be negotiable 
at anytime. This situation might hâve the effect of inducing management 
to seek to extend, rather than iimit, the coverage of the collective agree-
ment. Whereas managements security now largely cornes from the strike 
prohibition, coupled with the management residual rights doctrine, with 
the proposed change, it would best be established in the agreement ; 
10
 Paul C. WEILER, Labour Arbitration and Industrial Change, Task Force 
Study, No. 6, Ottawa, 1968. 
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otherwise management might face a légal strike during the life of the 
agreement. There would still be a rôle for the arbitrator, but only on 
rights disputes under the agreement. However, whereas at présent a ruling 
that a grievance is not arbitrable, under the residual rights doctrine is 
really a décision in favour of management, under the Weiler proposai the 
issue would become negotiable and subject to a possible strike since the 
protection of the residual rights doctrine would hâve been removed by 
législation. 
EVALUATION 
The évidence supports the view that there is at least a limited rôle 
for collective bargaining in the process of resolving the employment and 
social problems flowing from industrial conversion. This was recognized 
by Freedman, by the Task Force, by the drafters of Bill C-183 and by at 
least those employers such as the railways and many others who hâve 
included in collective agreements clauses which establish a variety of 
employée rights and protections if confronted with the insecurities pro-
moted by change. The question is then principally, what form should 
public policy take to make the best use of collective bargaining, taking 
into account the conflicting économie and social goals of that fuzzy thing 
called the public interest. The best I can do is to make a few value 
judgements on the various proposais and on the attitudes of management 
and labour. 
ORGANIZED BUSINESS 
Generally, organized business supports the status quo which involves 
a legalistic contract conception of the collective agreement, supported by 
the residual rights theory in arbitrations. In practice this means that a 
union would be required to negotiate to finality when the contract is 
opened by its termination. Since change is introduced by management, 
the union will not be in a position to hâve foreknowledge of impending 
changes and will, therefore, not be in a position to engage in very meaning-
ful negotiations in some circumstanees. Those who support this position 
are in practical terms setting low limits to the usefulness of collective 
bargaining as a problem-^ solving instrument in this particular area, or are 
rejecting it altogether. In my opinion it is an untenable position because 
it runs away from the very real problem that exists. 
FREEDMAN RECOMMENDATIONS 
The veto granted to the unions under the Freedman recommendations, 
understandably supported by the unions, is in my view unsatisfactory. It 
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has the opposite effect from the status quo position of employers. As 
already podnted out, that stand tends to force collective bargaining back to 
the contract negotiations period when the union suffers the great disad-
vantage of trying to negotiate about an unknown future. In the Freedman 
plan the tendency would be to delay negotiation until the next open period 
and to delay the introduction of change as well. I suggest that the status 
quo is too favourable to management, and Freedman is too restraining on 
management. What is needed is a System which brings negotiations into 
line with knowledge of the realities, and in some instances this will be 
within the life of the agreement. The provisions in Bill 183, in Weiler, 
in the Saskatchewan law, and in the Task Force recommendations ail 
attempt to do this. But which offers the most acceptable solution ? None 
of them is perfect, but I suggest that there are major faults at least in Bill 
183 and in the Saskatchewan law, which should be avoided. 
BILL C-183 
I hâve the following criticisms of Bill C-183. First it introduces an 
undesirable rôle for bureaucratie procédures. Management would not 
know what it could or could not do, nor would a union hâve any certainty 
until the Board ruled on its application for authority to serve notice of 
collective bargaining. There would be the customary time delays and the 
frustrations associated with such delays. One could expect considérable 
litigation over the exercise of the Board's jurisdiction, further delays and 
further frustrations. And there could be an insidious émergence of a cata-
logue of bargainable and non-bargainable issues as the Board and the 
Courts moved from case to case, especially since every case would require 
a Board décision. More important, the Board would perhaps be playing 
a rôle that would overlap with grievance arbitration, a resuit that should 
be avoided in the interest of preserving the integrity of the System. 
The Saskatchewan policy, at least in the first instance, avoids the 
bureaucratie cumbersomeness of the fédéral bill, by establishing that the 
union's right to re-open are available until taken away. This should 
eliminate much of the delays implioit in the Fédéral provision. Never-
theless, bureaucracy can be revived by a défensive application to the 
Board by the employer. 
More dangerous to stability is the provision to prohibit opting out. 
This means that the technological change issue ceases to be a trade-off 
item. It ruptures the principle of package bargaining and it may force 
employers to choose between strangulation or built-in uncertainty. 
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On thèse grounds I would reject the Bill 183 and the Saskatchewan 
solutions. If the interposition of the Board into the bargaining relation-
ship can be avoided, and the legitimate rôle of collective bargaining still 
be played, it should. 
THE WEILER PROPOSAL 
Weiler is sound in logic. The barrier to negotiated solutions rests in 
the reserved rights doctrines supported by the prohibition of the strike 
during the life of an agreement. But is the answer to be found in going 
over to the American system? Personally, I hâve no great fear that the 
utter disaster predicted if that should be done will in fact happen. I hâve 
no évidence that American employers hâve been unable to cope with the 
problem. The very high percentage of agreements which incorporate a 
no-strike pledge and arbitration, suggests that the system is workable. Be 
it noted that the negotiation of no-strike and binding arbitration clauses 
hâve the effect of establishing management residual rights by agreement 
of the parties. 
However, at least in the next few years, I suggest that it would be 
wise to proceed with some caution. The parties are used to the closed 
contract. Even in those jurisdictions where the strike can be re-instated 
through agreed re-openers, it appears to hâve been lalmost never used in 
this legitimate way — there are fairly fréquent illégal wildcats but that is 
another matter. Perhaps in the long run the American arrangement could 
be introduced ; in the short run it might be confusing. 
THE TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS 
As might be anticipated, I support the Task Force Recommendations, 
not because I believe they are the final answer, but because they represent 
the smallest change from existing légal provisions consistent with the need 
to open a door to possible negotiations during the life of an agreement. 
I would in fact go a bit beyond the Task Force Recommendations and 
urge that the parties should be free to opt out of the légal barrier on the 
strike and lockout on any basis they might wish. I would not limit the 
area as the Task Force does to industrial conversion issues, nor as the 
présent law does, to issues already provided for in the agreement, but 
with a re-opener. If the parties merely include in their agreement a clause 
that states any particular matter is negotiable and subject to strike action 
during the term of the agreement the law should recognize this as setting 
aside the présent barriers to such action. 
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This proposai should be satisfactory to the unions, since it gives them 
the right to strike for the right of intra-contract negotiations, and intra-
contract strikes. It should be welcomed by the employers because it gives 
them a séries of bargainable options. It should bring joy to labour relations 
boards who would be protected from the threat of an almost intolérable 
burden contained in Bill C-183, and it should calm the nerves of Ministers 
of Labour and their Deputies for1 dumping a very difficult issue back into 
the collective bargaining arena where it belongs. Incidentally, it makes 
the life of conciliators more pleasant by providind negotiable alternatives 
to play with. 
I should repeat, however, that the major responsibility for the 
solution of the problems posed for workers confronted by change must 
rest with governments. Employment and manpower policies should be 
geared to providing insurance that the burden of the costs of change will 
not be borne by the labour force alone. If this responsibility is not 
accepted by governments collective bargaining will be confronted with an 
impossible task. Rather than performing a rôle of smoothing ont transi-
tional problems of adjustment it will be asked to assume the basic task 
of labour force reallocation. In a trade-off between finding satisfactory 
adjustment for displaced workers and the introduction of change, em-
ployers might find the comparative cost factor favouring the status quo, 
in which case a gênerai lower level of efficiency might be the price. 
Changements technologiques et droit de grève 
La convention collective régit seulement une partie des relations entre les tra-
vailleurs couverts par cette convention et l'employeur. Certains conflits d'intérêt 
non sujets à la convention peuvent parfois se régler volontairement à l'intérieur 
des cadres de la négociation. Cependant il en est d'autres pour lesquels il n'y a pas 
de solution ou que l'une des deux parties refusera de négocier en se basant sur la 
doctrine des droits résiduels ou la convention elle-même. Ceci peut causer de la 
frustration chez les travailleurs et conduire à poser des actes illégaux. Ce problème 
a suscité récemment une importante controverse dans l'opinion publique et a été 
mis en évidence lors du débat sur les changements technologiques à la suite de 
l'introduction des locomotives diesels par les chemins de fer. Les syndicats ont 
insisté sur le droit de négocier ces questions pendant la durée de la convention ou 
pour limiter le droit de la direction d'apporter de tels changements pendant la 
durée de la convention si de tels changements ont un effet négatif sur l'emploi ou 
sur les conditions de travail. La direction a fortement refusé ces deux approches 
et a prôné le statu quo à ce sujet. 
Diverses mesures ont été proposées pour régler ce problème. Certaines l'ont 
été à la suite de recherches effectuées par des groupes non engagés dans ces pro-
blèmes. Le projet de Code canadien du travail contient toute une partie longue et 
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compliquée qui reflète un changement de politique à cet égard au niveau fédéral. 
Le gouvernement de la Saskatchewan a aussi apporté des changements dans sa 
politique. 
Le Code canadien du travail permet la négociation collective pendant la durée 
de la convention si le Conseil des relations de travail juge que le changement tech-
nologique proposé touche les conditions de travail ou la sécurité d'emploi d'un 
nombre important d'employés. En plus, si ces négociations n'aboutissent pas, on 
peut légalement recourir à la grève. L'employeur peut se protéger en donnant un 
avis de changement pendant la période normale de négociation avant que la con-
vention ne soit signée. Ceci fournit au syndicat l'occasion de négocier les effets 
probables des changements annoncés. 
L'Équipe spécialisée en relations du travail a proposé que les parties pouvaient 
inclure, à la signature de la convention, une clause de réouverture concernant les 
conversions industrielles. Dans un tel cas, la négociation et la grève seraient per-
mises pendant la durée de la convention. Le juge Freedman a recommandé que si, 
suite à une demande syndicale un arbitre décide que les effets d'un changement 
proposé sont majeurs, l'employeur ne pourrait pas effectuer ces changements avant 
les nouvelles négociations. Sa recommandation ne comprend pas le recours à la 
grève comme le prévoit le projet de Code et comme le faisait le Rapport de l'Équipe 
spécialisée. M. Jean Marchand, ancien ministre de la main-d'œuvre, suggère que si 
l'employeur décide d'introduire des changements influençant les droits des em-
ployés, la convention devrait automatiquement expirer et de nouvelles négociations 
devraient être faites. Le professeur Paul Weiler propose que l'obligation de négocier 
ne devrait pas se terminer avec la signature de la convention, mais devrait con-
tinuer d'exister pour tous les problèmes qui ne sont pas déjà couverts par l'accord. 
Les recommandations de Weiler et Marchand détruiraient à toute fin pratique 
la doctrine des droits résiduels. Le Code du travail revisé protégerait cette doctrine 
pour des changements mineurs mais l'abrogerait dans des cas importants tels que 
définis par le Conseil des relations de travail. L'Équipe spécialisée, pour sa part, 
respecte la doctrine des droits résiduels mais autoriserait les parties à en négocier 
la portée dans les cas de conversion. La proposition Freedman transférerait, dans 
les changements majeurs, les droits résiduels au syndicat. 
Une modification de la proposition de l'Équipe spécialisée inclue dans le 
Rapport de la Commission d'enquête sur l'industrie de la construction en Nouvelle-
Ecosse (1970) propose qu'on maintienne les dispositions légales actuelles mais que 
les parties soient libres, pendant la période normale de négociation, de s'entendre 
pour enlever en partie ou totalement les contraintes imposées dans les négociations 
par la loi et d'y inclure le recours à la grève. 
Cette dernière proposition est préférable, car elle laisse aux parties les déci-
sions sur les matières négociables ainsi que les contraintes de la doctrine des droits 
résiduels. En plus elle évite l'intrusion de l'appareil bureaucratique comme le Con-
seil des relations de travail et les arbitres. 
